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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes and analyzes mathematical descriptive models of the effect 
of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations on the population of a nation experiencing 
stability operations.  The model is a system of differential equations representing 
insurgent activity, insurgent recruiting, insurgent removal by the coalition; the 
population’s tolerance for insurgent violence; occurrence of actions by the coalition and 
insurgency the population perceives as beneficial and damaging, and the resulting change 
in the population’s support for the government.  The study focuses on a single population, 
attempting to identify and model the first order effects of stability force actions on the 
population.  We represent and study the effect of possible strategies by local government 
and external stability forces to influence popular support toward the government.  We 
find the greatest increase in popular support occurs when the coalition concentrates on 
performing actions perceived by the population as beneficial and mitigating the effects of 
its damaging actions. When the population does not perceive insurgent actions as 
damaging, we find the coalition has difficulty increasing popular support for the 
government. Coalition cooperation with local leaders in planning and executing 
beneficial actions may increase the perceived effect of coalition actions the population 
perceives as beneficial.  
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While traditional warfare focuses on military force-on-force engagements, the 
long-term goal of stability operations is often "to help develop indigenous capacity for 
securing essential services, a viable market economy…democratic institutions, and a 
robust civil society" (DoD Directive 1).  Understanding the motivations of the indigenous 
population is crucial to achieving this goal, and it is useful to model the effects of the 
stability force actions on popular opinion. 
We propose and analyze mathematical descriptive models of the effect of 
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations on the general population using systems of 
differential equations. The system of differential equations  represent insurgent activity, 
insurgent recruiting, and insurgent removal by the coalition; the population’s tolerance 
for insurgent actions perceived as damaging; and the occurrence of actions by both the 
coalition and insurgent forces that are viewed by the population as being damaging or 
beneficial and their effects on changing the population’s support for the government. 
Through analytical and numerical solutions, we study the model’s implications of the 
effects of stability force actions on the support of the population for the government of a 
country experiencing stability operations.  The primary goal is to provide coalition 
decision makers insight into how best to employ the forces and influence the factors 
under their control.   
We first consider a case in which the support of the population for the government 
depends only on the actions of the coalition and focus our analysis on factors under a 
coalition decision maker’s direct control. We find that the greatest positive effect comes 
when the decision maker concentrates on both performing actions deemed beneficial by 
the population and mitigating the effects of damaging coalition actions. Next we consider 
a case where both coalition and insurgent actions affect the population’s support for the 
government; the insurgency recruits from outside of the population and there are no 
desertions from the insurgency.  The results of this model illustrate a crucial point:  the 
effectiveness of coalition actions on the population's support of the government depends 
on the population’s perception of the actions of the insurgency. If the population tends to 
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view insurgency actions as predominantly beneficial, then even a coalition accomplishing 
actions seen as predominantly beneficial can do very little to influence the popular 
support for the government. In this case mitigation of the grievances that created the 
insurgency may increase the popular support for the government.  If the population tends 
to view insurgency actions as predominantly damaging, then even a coalition 
accomplishing actions that are neither predominantly beneficial nor predominantly 
damaging has a positive significant influence on the popular support for the government.  
Finally, we consider a model with full interaction of coalition and insurgent actions, 
insurgent recruiting from the population, and parameter values informed by conflict data 
from Anbar province in Iraq.  We consider three scenarios: pre-surge, post-surge and 
post-"Anbar Awakening."  With our chosen parameters, we conclude the increase in 
government support in the post-surge scenario is a result of a sizeable decrease in 
population's tolerance for insurgent violence without a sizeable decrease in insurgent 
violence.  The fact that government support increases faster in the post-surge scenario 
than the pre-surge scenario also contributes to the overall increased government support 
at 52 weeks in the post-surge scenario than the pre-surge scenario.  The effect on the 
population of beneficial actions by the coalition may be increased by cooperation with 
local leaders in planning beneficial actions. Increased coalition neighborhood security 
operations may lower the population’s tolerance for insurgent violence.  
The effectiveness of the coalition stability operations depends on the population’s 
perception of the actions of the insurgency and the population's tolerance for insurgent 
violence.  The population is more likely to be influenced to support the government if the 
population has a low tolerance for insurgent violence, and the insurgency engages in 
actions that are perceived to be damaging by the population. Models of insurgency/ 
counterinsurgency operations must include: actions of coalition against the insurgency; 
the actions of the coalition and the insurgency and their effect on population support of 




Everything is simple and neat – except, of course, the world. 
– Nigel Goldenfeld and Leo P. Kadanoff 
 
 Combat models are a widely accepted tool used to represent and analyze warfare 
processes and events. In 1916, W.F. Lanchester was among the first theorists to attempt 
to model warfare using a system of ordinary differential equations.  Since the publication 
of "Lanchester’s Laws" of combat, military analysts have turned to mathematical combat 
models, in many different forms, for insight into how opposing forces interact in battle.  
With the evolution of warfare from conventional (World War I and Lanchester’s era) to 
an ever-increasing number of insurgent-based battles (Vietnam thru current times), 
mathematical combat models must also evolve. 
 An increased occurrence of asymmetric warfare and insurgent activities throughout 
the world necessitates an extension to existing combat models to better understand 
emerging asymmetric combat situations. As Gompert states,  
The relationship between insurgents and contested populations is such that 
knowing how, when, where, against whom, by whom, and …whether to 
use deadly force is both more difficult and more consequential (in 
irregular warfare) than in regular warfare.  Appeals are increasing to ‘fight 
smarter’ against extremist insurgents, a response to frustration over the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the persistence of global terrorism (1).  
 To realize their full utility, the extended models must represent effects of popular 
opinion, culture, and social interactions. Lang argues that it is the link between the 
insurgent and the area population that allows "insurgents to attack coalition forces or to 
plant improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and then fade back into the population"(16).  
 Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, Joseph 
Collins, loosely defines stability operations as "military operations outside of combat, 
which usually take place in a post-conflict situation" (Vinall 1).  While traditional 
warfare missions focus on military force-on-force engagements, stability operations have, 
in the past, centered on "winning the hearts and minds" of the local government, militia, 
and civilian population thru actions other than war.  The attendees of the 
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Counterinsurgency Symposium in 1962 called "the primary objective of counter guerrilla 
warfare…not merely the guerrilla’s elimination, neutralization, and conversion, but 
winning over the apathetic majority of the people" (Hosmer 12).   
 In recent years, stability operations have become a focus activity of the United 
States military forces, and the Department of Defense has established a refined set of 
goals and objectives for military support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) operations:   
Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances 
U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local 
populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian 
needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for 
securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, 
democratic institutions, and a robust civil society (DoD Directive 1).   
 Often, insurgent groups emerge to take advantage of instability in post-conflict 
nations.  The roots of insurgency are by no means clear-cut, but Jacobs, et al. offer some 
explanation:  
Typically, the presence of the insurgency and the existence of civil strife 
and terrorist actions are the result of grievances between a minority of the 
population and its government or between two or more subpopulations. 
The insurgency groups engage in violence to undermine the authority of 
the government. Successful elimination or suppression of the insurgency 
depends on the ability to address the grievances of the minority and thus 
reduce the popular support for the insurgency – a key factor in the ability 
of an insurgency to thrive. The military troops assigned to such a stability 
operation require ... knowledge of the culture and history of the region, 
including reasons for insurgency formation; language skills; and 
diplomatic skills...(to) include determining and implementing processes to 
mitigate the grievances of the minority.  Mitigating the grievances of the 
minority often causes tensions with the host nation government (Jacobs 
"Effect" 1). 
 Clearly, understanding the underlying motivations of the indigenous population is 
crucial to effectively quelling an insurgent uprising and fulfilling the SSTR objectives. It 
is useful to model the effects of the stability force actions on popular opinion. 
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  To this end, this thesis proposes and analyzes mathematical descriptive models of 
the effect of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations on the general population. One 
such initial model is described in the working paper entitled "A Model for the Effect of 
Coalition Actions on a Population in a Stability Operation" authored by Professors 
Jacobs, Kress, and Gaver of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Operations Research 
department. Other models are discussed in working papers by Jacobs, et al. entitled 
"Deterministic 'Fluid' Models for Consequences of Coalition Actions in a Stability 
Operation" and Gaver, et al. entitled "A Model for the Effect of Coalition Actions on a 
Population in a Stability Operation Resulting from Discussion of Gaver, Jacobs, and 
Kress on January 18, 2008" (Jacobs, et al. "Fluid"; Gaver, et al.). 
The primary goal of our study is to identify and model the first order effects of 
stability force actions on the population and the trade-off decisions necessary for a 
stability force with limited resources. Lang proposes several recommended stability 
actions to include military actions such as border security systems and a permanent area 
security presence as well as non-military actions such as amnesty and reward programs 
(65-73).  Although his suggestions for improvement are all valid, area commanders will 
likely not have enough resources to accomplish all missions simultaneously.  
 Through analytical and numerical solutions, our study investigates the 
mathematical models’ operational implications for the counterinsurgency forces in the 
modeled region/population and investigates possible courses of action (COAs) by both 
main players in counterinsurgency operations — local government and external stability 
forces — based on varied initial states.  In Jacobs, et al. and in this study, we present a 
dynamic model representing the social cultural and behavioral aspects of the interaction 
between the stability forces and the local population and study the influence of those 
aspects on stability operations.   
 The "indigenous population" for this study consists of 3 groups.  The first, a 
majority group, is the collection of host nation individuals who are controlled at least 
nominally by a local government and can be thought of as supporting the government.  
The second, a minority group, is discriminated against by the government, has little 
political power, and its members are generally impoverished and experience frustration.  
  4
The second group is categorized as opposing the government.  Finally, there is an 
insurgency consisting of members of the minority group who use violence against the 
government and may use coercive actions (kidnapping and assassinations, IEDs, etc.) 
against the majority and/or minority groups to induce the government to share resources 
and political power with the minority group or to intimidate members in the minority 
group as a means of recruitment (Jacobs, et al. "Effect" 2-3). 
 The "coalition force" in this study refers to a collection of multi-national allies the 
local government invites to assist in quelling the insurgency.  Initially, the coalition 
forces are most likely lacking in host nation cultural knowledge and experience. The 
initial role of the coalition forces may center around military and police actions, and these 
actions may well be performed with little cultural sensitivity due to lack of cultural 
training. The coalition forces are likely garrisoned outside of population centers (Jacobs, 
et al. "Effect" 2-3). 
 The study focuses on a single population of influence and draws conclusions from 
analytical and numerical solutions that highlight the models’ operational implications for 
counterinsurgency forces in the modeled region/population. With resource constraints in 
mind, this study represents and analyzes the effect of possible strategies by local 
government and external stability forces to influence popular support toward the 
government. 
 The models developed and conclusions put forth in this thesis are part of a project 
entitled "Representing Urban Cultural Geography in Urban Stability Operations", 
sponsored by the TRADOC Analysis Center-Monterey (TRAC-MRY).  The model is 
intended to be descriptive, and the analysis done in this study may provide decision 
makers with insight into how best to employ the forces and influence the factors under 
their control. 
 Chapter II provides a brief review of some current sociological models as well as 
counterinsurgency operations, policies, and tactics.  Chapter III develops the differential 
equations-based models, discusses their behavior, and presents analytical solutions. 
Finally, Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to 
everything else in the universe. 
– John Muir, Naturalist, Writer, and Conservationalist 
A. VISCOSITY MODELS AND DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 
Social scientists and social network theorists have long studied analytic models of 
innovation diffusion throughout a population using "viscosity models."  The term 
"innovation" has been applied to new ideas, new technologies, or new management 
practices that diffuse through an organization or population via agents within that social 
system/population (qtd. in Krackhardt 177).  In his paper entitled "Viscosity Models and 
Diffusion of Controversial Innovations," David Krackhardt goes one step further to 
define "controversial innovations" as "an innovation whose value (and subsequent 
adoption) is socially determined and not rationally determined" (177).  This extension of 
definition suggests an extension of the viscosity model itself to include "innovations" 
such as the validity of a rumor, the impact of an action, and the influence of fellow 
agents’ opinions.  In this context, it is useful to think of changes in popular opinion 
toward an action taken against that population as a diffusion of ideas and the viscosity 
model as a means of modeling the change in popular opinion over time. 
Krackhardt’s discrete time model can be found in its entirety in the paper cited in 
this study’s references.  A more complex extension of the model includes a matrix of 
attributes attached to each entity in the network, or agent, that may influence other 
agents, but the main points of the basic model remain the same and are summarized:  
1. The model relies on a relationship of idea "adopters" and "non-adopters"  
2. The model is based on agent migration between and among groups during each time 
period as each agent searches the system for like-minded individuals. 
3. The model uses a probabilistic approach to determine if migrating agents will 
encounter like-minded agents and whether, having found none, the isolated agent will 
"convert" to the opposite view. The key driver for system change is this conversion 
rate of "adopters" and "non-adopters." 
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 In a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Lieutenant Commander Harrison 
Schramm provides a framework to study ideology propagation by adapting analytic 
models previously used to epidemics.  Schramm employs infectious disease and rumor 
propagation models to investigate the spread of two opposing ideologies in a closed 
population.  His study includes the case where "contrarians and supporters openly vie for 
a greater share of support from the public" (Schramm xv).  With his model, Schramm 
finds "a relatively small number of contrarians are required to overcome a large increase 
in supporters" (27). 
B. COMPARATIVE POLITICS:  PROXIMITY vs. DIRECTIONAL MODELS 
 In their article "Issues and Party Competition in the Netherlands," Aarts, 
MacDonald, and Rabinowitz assert, "At the heart of any democratic political system is 
the question of how public opinion relates to government policy" (63). Comparing results 
from two models, the authors investigate the relationship between policy preferences of 
the Dutch voters and how the voter views each political party.   
 Aarts, MacDonald, and Rabinowitz first employ a directional model in which 
parties and individuals are placed on the directional continuum of political ideology.  As 
shown in Figure 1 from Aarts, et al., the neutral center is assigned a value of zero, "left 
supporter" positions are assigned negative values, and "right supporter" positions are 
assigned positive values.  Parties are positioned more distant from the neutral center 
based on how strongly they advocate positions of the left or the right.   
 
Figure 1.   Directional Continuum of Political Ideology                                 
(From Aarts et al. 67) 
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 Each voter is assumed to have a specific ideal point that represents the policy that 
he or she most prefers.  The assumption is that voters are attracted to parties whose 
actions align with the voter's preferred position, and the effects of party cues and actions 
are mathematically modeled via a utility function (Aarts, et al. 67).  Voters in the center 
are neutral.  They have no issue preference and are assumed to support all parties about 
the same (Aarts, et al. 67). The "rightness" or "leftness" of a party or individual is 
determined by the model user based on how intensely the individual or party supports 
conventional political definitions.  According to Wikipedia, left-wing parties and 
individuals generally "seek to reform social hierarchies and promote an equal distribution 
of wealth and privilege.  The left advocates for a society where all people are on equal 
footing" (Wikipedia "Left").  On the other hand, right-wing politics are "generally 
defined as politics that seeks to uphold or a return to traditional authorities and/or the 
liberties of a civil society and the preservation of the domestic culture, usually in the face 
of external forces for change. In general, the right also advocates the preservation of 
personal wealth and emphasizes more self reliance" (Wikipedia "Right").   
 Aarts, et al. describe the placement of parties and individuals on the continuum:  
Parties that are consistent and vocal advocates of left policies would be 
positioned well to the left.  Those that are more equivocal yet generally 
favorable toward the left would be located on the moderate left, and so on 
across the spectrum.  Party position is not solely a function of the party’s 
own efforts; it can be influenced by opposition strategy as well as by the 
media and ongoing events (66). 
 
 The party's success in capturing voter support is determined through a 
utility or affect function (Aarts, et al. 67-68): 
ij k k ik jk ij
A s I I P= ∑ −  
where: 
ks = intensity of the issue 
ikI = position of voter i on the directional continuum for issue k 
jkI = position of party j on the directional continuum for issue k 
ijP = penalty if the party becomes "too intense" compared to voter i preference 
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When party voters are on the same side of the issue, ik jkI I∗ will be more positive, and 
product will higher the more intense either the voter or the party becomes (Aarts, et al. 
68). 
 The authors next propose a Downsian spatial (proximity) model where each voter 
is assumed to have a specific ideal point that represents the policy that he or she most 
prefers.  The origins of this model can be found in depth in Anthony Downs' book 
entitled "An Economic Theory of Democracy" (Downs). In this model, each party offers 
a set of policy alternatives that locate the party at a particular point in a multidimensional 
issue space. In contrast to a directional model where the center reflects neutrality, the 
center of a spatial model is a viable policy alternative.  According to the spatial model, 
voters evaluate parties based on how close they are to their own position, and utility 
declines with distance (or, distance squared) (Aarts, et al. 68).    
 The party's success in capturing voter support is determined through a utility or 
affect function:  
2( )
ij k k ik jk
A s θ θ= −∑ −  
where: 
ks = intensity of the issue 
ikθ = position of voter i on the proximity continuum for issue k 
jkθ = position of party j on the proximity continuum for issue k 
(Aarts, et al. 68-69)  
 By varying individual initial positions and subsequent party actions, Aarts, 
MacDonald, and Rabinowitz plot the percentage of voters in 4 parties (center, moderate 
right, moderate left, and far right) versus the left-right continuum for each model.  The 
authors compare the results and evaluate the relationship between the initial voter 
position and the party action.  For directional theory model plot, the authors evaluate the 
slope of the plot for each party prediction--the more extreme the party, the steeper the 
slope will be (Aarts, et al. 69).  For the proximity model plot, the authors look for 
monotonically increasing functions as predictors of an extreme party. 
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 Lastly, Aarts, et al. compare both models with three historical case studies, the 
1971, 1986, and 1994 Dutch National elections, using actual data and comparing known 
outcomes to verify the model findings. They conclude "... Dutch parties could be sharply 
differentiated in the minds of the voters. This occurred most dramatically in 1986, but 
there was some real differentiation between the parties in each of the three elections that 
we studied. What will happen in the future depends to a large extent on the actions of the 
parties" (Aarts et al. 96). 
C. SOCIAL INFLUENCE EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
 Friedkin and Johnsen use equilibrium models to investigate how networks of 
interpersonal influences affect an individual’s opinion.  They describe personal opinion 
formation as a process by which exogenous conditions such as group and individual 
characteristics (inputs) transform a member’s or group’s settled opinion (outputs) over 
time (Friedkin & Johnsen 193).  Their models use other "peer" opinions (those which 
directly affect an individual) as the chief influential condition.  Friedkin and Johnsen’s 
deterministic approach assumes an individual’s opinions are completely accounted for by 
a set of known causal variables.  The process is decomposable into distinct predictive 
time periods, and the process of opinion formation continues until all changes that might 
have occurred play out.  The highlighted conclusion of the analysis is to suggest that 
"social conflict and social conformity behaviors simultaneously exist in any group" 
(Friedkin & Johnsen 205). 
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
As Dr Kathie Olsen of the National Science Foundation states, "The science of 
complexity seeks to develop tools and methods to study the emergence of collective 
properties in systems with large numbers of interacting parts" (1). Physical scientists have 
long studied complex systems to understand how these organisms behave under the 
standard laws of physics.  In her discussion, Dr Olsen reminds the audience of the link 
between previous methods of studying physical systems and the emerging use of 
complexity analysis to study patterns of behavior.  Among many applications, she cites 
two examples: the use of complexity analyses to analyze collective behaviors to predict 
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the point at which a peaceful crowd may become a stampede; and the use of agent-based 
complexity models to better predict the patterns by which a disease is likely to spread 
into a global pandemic (Olsen).   
Goldenfeld and Kandoff propose a key question in their article, "Simple Lessons from 
Complexity":   
The world contains complex ‘ecologies’ at all levels, from huge mountain 
ranges, to the delicate ridge on the surface of a sand dune, to the salt spray 
coming off a wave, to the interdependencies of financial markets, to the 
true ecologies formed by living things. Each situation is highly organized 
and distinctive, with biological systems forming a limiting case of 
exceptional complexity. So why, if the laws are so simple, is the world so 
complicated? (88) 
Through their analysis, they reach a conclusion apropos to our study: "Apparently 
there are no general laws for complexity. Instead, one has to reach for ‘lessons’ which 
might, with insight and understanding, be learned in one system and applied to another" 
(Goldenfeld & Kandoff 89).  In the context of this study, it is useful to view the 
indigenous population in a country experiencing stability operations as the system and 
model its behavior in light of prescribed "rules" and lessons learned from the fields of 
complexity analysis and chaos theory can be applied to the analysis of popular opinion. 
One such modeling effort is currently being undertaken by Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis students Thorsten Seitz and Todd Ferris as part of the project entitled 
"Representing Urban Cultural Geography in Urban Stability Operations", sponsored by 
the TRADOC Analysis Center-Monterey (TRAC-MRY).  As part of their analysis, Seitz 
and Ferris model stability operations in the agent-based modeling system Pythagoras.  
Seitz and Ferris define specific characteristics for each agent or entity in the model, to 
include whether the entity supports, opposes, or is neutral toward the government, and 
then introduce events which represent stability force actions.  They examine the resulting 
interactions among entities and the changes in popular support, neutrality, or opposition 
of the government. 
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E. STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION 
(SSTR) OPERATIONS 
Although counterinsurgency and stability operations, policies, and tactics have 
been relatively stagnant since the Vietnam Conflict, post- 9/11, military leaders have 
begun to redefine the goals and objectives of these operations. Department of Defense 
Directive 3000.05 on SSTR, released in 2005, states "stability operations are a core U.S. 
military mission but it also places much emphasis on the need for work closely with 
relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global 
and regional international organizations, even going as far as to suggest "many stability 
operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals" 
(3). The directive suggests the DoD should provide opportunities for personnel to 
develop stability operations skills by: "…learning languages and studying foreign 
cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies" (DoD 7).  This last 
suggestion clearly communicates a need for stability agents (forces engaging in stability 
operations) to understand the people and culture with which they will be interacting and 
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III. DYNAMIC MODEL 
Science, mathematics, and warfare have always been most closely linked; in 
fact, except for a certain portion of the nineteenth century, it may be fairly 
claimed that the majority of significant technical and scientific advances 
owe their origin directly to military or naval requirements.  
 
– British science historian, John Desmond Bernal, 1939. 
A. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES 
 The mathematical notations and equations chosen for this study are identical to 
those in the working paper by Jacobs, et al. titled "A Model for the Effect of Coalition 
Actions on a Population in a Stability Operation" and are directly quoted in the following 
paragraphs.  This model is one of many possible.  Each member of the modeled 
population is either a member of the insurgency (I), a supporter of the government (G) or 
a supporter of I with: 
( )S t = size of the population that support the government (G) at time t ; 
( )O t = size of the population that support the insurgency (I) (opposition) at time t ; the 
group is not active in actions against the government, but is inclined to assist the active 
insurgents; 
( )I t = size of the insurgency at time t ; 
The total population size at time t is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t S t O t I tΦ = + + ; 
( )C t = size of the coalition forces at time t . 
We use the notation S, O, I, and C to denote the supporters, opposition, 
insurgency, and coalition forces, respectively. The set S is comprised mostly of people 




oppose the violence of the insurgents and seek a compromise and agreement. Similarly, 
the set O is comprised mostly of people from the minority group, but may also contain 
members of the majority group.  
There are 2 Actors: the Coalition Forces, (C), and the Insurgency (I). The actions 
taken by each are interpreted by the population as being beneficial (B) or damaging (D) 
for a finite length of time, which may be affected by media coverage and public opinion 
manipulation by the actors. An action is called active if it is still influencing the 
population attitude and behavior. The labeling of an action as beneficial or damaging 
occurs at the time of the action and is determined by the nature of the action and the 
identity of the actor. The effect of beneficial (civilian affair) actions by C may be 
enhanced, and the effect of its damaging (military) actions lessened if the C forces are 
better trained in local culture and language. We assume that the labeling of an action does 
not depend on the (sub) population that is subject to this action.  
State variables 
Coalition 
( )C t = the size of the coalition force at time t 
( )CB t = the expected number of actions by C that are active at time t and are perceived to 
be beneficial by the population. 
( )CD t =the expected number of actions by C that are active at time t and are considered 
to be damaging by the population. 
Insurgency 
( )I t = the size of the insurgency at time t 
( )IB t = the expected number of actions by I that are active at time t and are perceived to 
be beneficial by the population. 
( )ID t = the expected number of actions by I that are active at time t and are perceived to 
be damaging by the population. 
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Population 
( )S t = size of the population that support the government (G) at time t  
( )O t = size of the population that support the insurgency (I) (opposition) at time t  
Parameters 
1. Cγ  = Removal rate of I by coalition forces. In Jacobs et al. this parameter is a 
linear function of the level of government support in the population. 
2. Cα+  = Arrival rate of actions per member of C that are perceived by the 
population as being beneficial. This parameter represents both the level of civil-
affairs activity and its effectiveness, which depends on social, cultural and lingual 
training of the coalition forces, henceforth called social training.  In the working 
paper, Jacobs, et al., further refines this parameter with a function that accounts 
for the mean time it takes to social-train the whole force and the impact of social 
training on the way military and civil-affair actions are perceived in the 
population. In this study, the impact of Cα+  is investigated using sensitivity 
analysis by which the single-valued numerical input is assumed to incorporate the 
amount and impact of social training. 
3. Cα−  = Arrival rate of damaging actions per member of C. This parameter 
represents collateral damage by military/police actions against the insurgency. 
This parameter increases as Cγ  increases and decreases as social training of the 
force increases.   
4. Cν +  = Rate at which beneficial actions by C cease to influence the attitude of the 
population towards the government. This parameter represents the effect of 
publicity of the beneficial actions and the type of actions that is perceived to be 
beneficial; e.g. actions that employ people from the population will exert 
influence for a longer time. 
5. Cν −  = Rate at which damaging actions by C cease to influence the population’s 
attitude. This parameter represents the effectiveness of the coalition force to 
mitigate the effects of actions perceived as damaging by the population. 
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6. Iβ +  = Arrival rate of beneficial actions per member of I.  
7. Iβ −  = Arrival rate of actions per member of I perceived as damaging by the 
population. This parameter represents rate of coercive actions by I against the 
population. 
8. Iμ+  = Rate at which beneficial actions by I cease to influence the population’s 
attitude.  
9. Iμ−  = Rate at which damaging actions by I cease to influence the population’s 
attitude.  
10. Iρ =Rate of recruitment from O to I. 
11. Iδ  = Desertion parameter from I into O. 
12. Cϕ+  (respectively Iϕ+ ) = Rate at which active actions by C (respectively I) 
perceived as beneficial by the population influence popular support for the 
government. The parameter is influenced by the rate at which information about 
the beneficial actions travel through the population, the fraction of the population 
that perceive the action as beneficial,   and the propensity of members of the 
population to be affected by beneficial actions 
13. Cϕ−  (respectively Iϕ− )= Rate at which active actions by C (respectively I) 
perceived to be damaging by the population influence popular support for the 
government. The parameter is influenced by the rate at which information about 
the damaging actions travel through the population, the fraction of the population 
that perceive the action as damaging, and the propensity of members of the 
population to be affected by damaging actions 
14. *ID  = Population tolerance for insurgent violence in units of the number of active 
damaging actions by I. 
B. MODEL FORMULATION 
The equations are those of Jacobs et al. from the working paper titled “A Model 
for the Effect of Coalition Actions on a Population in a Stability Operation."   
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Recruit Removal of I 
Desertion from I from O by C actions
to I
( )I I C
dI t S t
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 The desertion parameter, Iδ , indicates desertion for "convenience" rather than 
"ideological" desertion. An example of "convenience" desertion may be those part-time 
insurgents who return to the fields at harvest time.  Thus, in "convenience" desertion 
persons from I move to O.  The desertion from I is determined by multiplying the 
desertion parameter ( Iδ ), the percentage of the population that supports the government 
at time t ( ( )
( )
S t
tΦ ), and the percentage of the population active in the insurgency at time t 




( ) ( ( ) ( ( ) ) ) ( )
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ) ( )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
dS t B t D t D O t
dt




− + − +
= + −
− + + −  (6) 
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( ) ( ) *
*
( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ) ( )
( )
( ( ) ( ( ) ) ) ( )
I C C I I I I I
C C I I I I
S tdO t I t D t B t D D t S t
dt t
B t D t D O t
δ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ρ
− + − +
+ − +
= + + + −Φ
− + − + (7)  
 where ( )max ,0x x+ = . 
The insurgency may use ID  to coerce the population. The effect is favorable to I 
up to a certain level of violence *ID  (population tolerance) beyond which the effect is 
reversed.  The function *( ( ) )I I ID t Dϕ− +−  represents the effect of I’s coercive actions when 
they exceed the tolerance threshold of the population *ID , and it is monotone increasing. 
The function *( ( ))I I ID D tϕ− +− represents the effect of I’s coercive actions when the 
number of these actions is below the tolerance threshold *ID of the population. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Science, mathematics, and warfare have always been most closely linked; in 
fact, except for a certain portion of the nineteenth century, it may be fairly 
claimed that the majority of significant technical and scientific advances 
owe their origin directly to military or naval requirements.  
 
– British science historian, John Desmond Bernal, 1939. 
 
A. INFLUENCING RELATIONSHIPS IN THE EQUATIONS 
Because the purpose of this study is to provide insight to U.S. military decision 
makers, it is appropriate to focus the analysis on varying parameters under control of 
those decision makers.  From equations (1) through (7) in the previous discussion, we can 
derive influencing factors.   
Concentrating on the coalition actions perceived as beneficial by the population, 
we look at the steady-state, or limiting case, where the change in the state variables is 
zero.  Setting the left hand side of Equation (1) equal to 0 results in:  






+∞ = ∗ ∞  (8) 
( )CB ∞  represents the long run average number of beneficial actions influencing the 
population.  Equation (8) suggests that decision makers may be able to increase the 
expected number of actions that are perceived to be beneficial by increasing the arrival 
rate of beneficial actions (the arrival rate of beneficial actions is proportional to the size 
of the coalition forces).  Additionally, decision makers may choose to take actions that 
prolong the mean length of time the beneficial action is remembered, thereby reducing 
the parameter we call Cν + ; an example may be programs that employ members of the 
population.  
Alternatively, we can focus on reducing the expected number of coalition actions 
perceived as damaging by the population.  Again we look at the steady-state (limiting) 
case where the change in the state variables is zero, and setting the right hand side of 
equation (2) equal to 0 results in:  
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−∞ = ∗ ∞  (9) 
( )CD ∞  represents the long run average number of damaging actions influencing 
the population.  The equation suggests that, in the long run, decision makers may be able 
to decrease the expected number of actions perceived as damaging by decreasing the 
arrival rate of damaging actions (the rate at which damaging actions arrive is proportional 
to the size of the coalition force).  In opposition to the previous case, decision makers 
may choose to focus on actions that shorten the mean length of time the damaging action 
is remembered, thereby increasing the parameter we call Cν − . This may be accomplished 
through training the coalition force in the social customs of the population and working in 
cooperation with local leaders. 
B. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
To approximate the solution to the systems of ordinary differential equations in 
this study, we implement the model using a Runge-Kutta fourth order iterative algorithm 
(RK4) executed with Matlab Student Version 7.1.  More information on the Runge-Kutta 
algorithm can be found in Kendall Atkinson's book An Introduction to Numerical 
Analysis (see references).    
In the Matlab model, we represent S, O, and I, as fractions of the total population, 
 Φ(t) . That is, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1S t O t I t t+ + = Φ = .  We represent C as a percentage in relation to 
the total population Φ(0). Therefore, the "initial population in the area", Φ(0) + C(0), will 
always be greater than 1.  Parameters Cα + , Cα− , Cν + , Cν − , Cϕ+ , Cϕ− , Iϕ+ , Iϕ− , Iβ + , Iβ − , 
Iμ+ , Iμ− ,  ρI , Iδ , and Cγ are given fractional values to ensure all input magnitudes are 
consistent (except in cases of parameters informed by data).  All data used are scaled to 
be consistent with 1 model time step = 1 week.  With these assumptions, we use the 
algorithm to compare the numerical results to analytical solutions obtained for special 
cases of the equations.  Specific input parameters and values chosen for each case are 
displayed in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
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C. MODEL I—NO INSURGENCY INFLUENCE 
When considering how decision makers can influence the outcome of the conflict 
in which they are engaged, it is natural to start with a simplified version of the equations, 
concentrating only on factors directly under the decision makers' control:  Cα + , Cα− , Cν + , 
Cν − .  We also consider the rates at which active actions by C influence popular support 
for or against the government ( Cϕ+  and Cϕ− ).  Of the many possible, we consider a model 
in which insurgent forces do not engage the coalition forces and have no impact on the 
scenario outcome.  Numerical analysis of the full model can be found in section E of this 
thesis.  
In our first model, all insurgency related 
parameters, Iβ + , Iβ − , Iμ+ , Iμ− , Iϕ+ , Iϕ− , ρI , Iδ , and *ID  are set to zero.  We assume C(t)=C 
and S(t)+O(t)=1. When Cγ , the attrition rate of I by coalition forces, is also set to zero the 
















= (ϕC−DC (t)∗ S(t)) − (ϕC+ BC (t)∗O(t))  (13) 
  
 In the simplified model, the changes in S and O and the resulting percentage of 
the population in S and O at time t are complementary because the members of the 
population move only between these two groups.  Although initial conditions may 
indicate a percentage of the population belonging to I, there is no movement into or out 
of I, and that percentage remains constant.  
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1. Analytical Limiting Solution 
The left hand sides of Equations (10) through (13) are set equal to 0 and solved to 
find a limiting or steady-state solution.  The steady-state (limiting) and analytic (finite 
time, t) solutions for this system are derived in detail in the Appendix.  Algebraic 
manipulation yields the following steady-state relationship of the long run average 
number of government supporters to the long run average number of insurgent supporters 
as   
 
* ( )


















∞ = ∗ ∞∞∗
   (14) 






 support of 
the government will remain higher than support of the opposition.  Equations (8) and (9) 
allow the following interpretation of this algebraic inequality: in order to ensure support 
for the government remains higher than support for the opposition, decision makers must 
ensure the effect (that is represented by the Cϕ+ ) of the long run average number of 
actions by C that are active and are perceived to be beneficial ( ( )CB ∞ ) is greater than 
the effect of the long run average number of actions by C that are active and are 
perceived as damaging ( ( )CD t ).  The values of ( )S t   and ( )O t  remain coupled as  
t → ∞.   
Thus in this simplified model the long run average number of people in the 
population that support the government is a function of the ratio of the effect of the 
number of coalition actions that are perceived to be beneficial to the effect of the number 
of coalition actions that are perceived to be damaging. With our assumption that C 
remains constant, equation (14) suggests that in this simplified model an increase or 
decrease in ( )C ∞  has no effect on the end state outcome because the arrival rate of 
beneficial and damaging actions by C is proportional to the size of the coalition force.   
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2. Analytic Solution for Finite Time 
If we examine the analytic solution at a finite time t, the equations suggest how 
coalition actions might more quickly influence a turning point in the conflict.  Details of 
the finite time solution for this system are in the Appendix. 
 
Assuming constant C, 
( ) ( ) ( )0 * C tC CC C
C C
C CB t B e να αν ν
++ + −
+ +
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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− −
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
; 
let 
 ( )1 ( )C Cc t B tϕ+= ∗  and ( )2 ( )C Cc t D tϕ−= ∗  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )2 1 21 2 1 2
( (0) (0)) * (0) * (0)c t O S c t O c t S
A t and B t
c t c t c t c t
+ += =+ +  
then, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







( )( ) * *
( )
c t c t t
c t c t t
O t A t B t e


















, the faster the government 
gains supporters.  1( )c t  is the rate at which actions by C which are viewed as beneficial 
by the population influence the population to support the government. If the members of 
the population are slow to be influenced by beneficial actions (small Cϕ+ ) then more 
beneficial actions may be needed. Cϕ+  may be influenced by publicity of actions and 
obtaining coalition/government support of local leaders.   
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3. Numerical Exploration of the Transient Solution and Analysis 
 In this section we numerically explore the transient solution of equations (10) 











− on the transient behavior of the equations.  Figures 2 through 5 display numerical 









−  using the non-
zero parameter values listed in Table 1.  We see that a higher ratio results in a quicker 
time at which the initial minority of government supporters grows to equal the percentage 






Figure 3:  
 ratio=2 
Figure 4:  
 ratio=3 
Figure 5:  
 ratio=4 
(0)O  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
(0)S  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Cα+ , 0.2 0.5 0.75 0.8 
Cα− , 0.8 0.5 0.25 0.2 
Cν + , Cϕ+  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Cν − , Cϕ−  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
( ) ( )≈S t O t  ~52weeks ~10 weeks ~8 weeks ~6 weeks 
S(52) 0.50 0.65 0.72 0.87 
O(52) 0.50 0.35 0.28 0.13 
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(best viewed in color) 
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(best viewed in color) 
The results suggest the biggest "bang for the buck" occurs with a combination of 
effective publicity of beneficial coalition actions (decreasing Cν + ; that is increasing the 







− ).  The mean time a beneficial coalition action remains active is also 
influenced by the type of beneficial action (e.g. employment of the local population). Our 
model results also suggest that factors that increase the rate of beneficial coalition actions 
( Cα+  ) (respectively, decreasing the rate of damaging coalition actions), such as increased 
social training, have a strong impact. 
D. MODEL II—INSURGENCY INFLUENCE 
Expanding our analysis to include insurgency influence and incorporating all 
factors of the full model gives us a more complex representation of a typical scenario. 
The insurgents engage in beneficial and damaging actions which affect the population's 
support for the government.  In the general model, the insurgents experience the removal 
of members by coalition action and desertion of existing members back to O.  In other 
words, members of the population move S → O, O → S, I → O, O → I, or completely out 
of the population when members of I are removed by coalition action.  
Unfortunately, when considering the full model there is no mathematical theory 
that leads to an analytical solution of the fully coupled, non-linear system with all 
parameters non-zero.  However, the equations can be modified so that the size of the 
population, Φ(t) , remains constant, and a limiting solution for the system can be found.  
An analysis of one of many possible models with constant Φ(t)  is presented in the 
working paper by Jacobs, et al. entitled "Deterministic 'Fluid' Models for Consequences 
of Coalition Actions in a Stability Operation" (Jacobs, et. al, "Fluid" 15-17).  The 
numerical analysis of our full model can be found in section E of this thesis. 
Given that the full model is analytically intractable, our second model (one of 
many possible) is more complex than our first model with some insurgency interaction. 
In our second model the insurgents may recruit new members, but those members do not 
come from O or S.  Insurgent members may be removed by the coalition, but the 
insurgency does not experience desertion ( Iδ  is set to zero).  In our second model, 
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insurgency and coalition actions influence the exchange of members between O and S as 
members of the population move O→S and/or S→O. 
1. A Modified Model and its Analytical Limiting Solution 
In our second model, all insurgency related parameters, Iβ + , Iβ − , Iμ+ , Iμ− , Iϕ+ , 
Iϕ− ,  ρI , and *ID , are non-zero except Iδ .  The model becomes a system of seven 
ordinary, linear, differential equations: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
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ϕ ϕ ϕ
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− + −  (21) 
 where ( )max ,0x x+ = . 
 We assume the size of the coalition force is constant equal to C.  Equations (15) 
through (21) can be solved analytically to find a limiting relationship when t →∞  and 
changes in the state variables S, O, I are zero.  If we assume ( ) ( ) 0dS t dO t
dt dt
= = as t →∞ , 
equations (20) and (21) approach the following long run average solutions in equations 
(22) and (23) as t →∞ .  Equations (22) and (23) are reduced to the single equation 
(1.22) when S(t) and O(t) reach steady state equilibrium as t →∞ .  Because we assume 
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with ( )max ,0x x+ = . 
 The relationships in equation (22) and (23) suggest that if *( )I ID D∞ >  and 
( )C CBϕ+ ∞ > ( ) ( )C C I ID Bϕ ϕ− +∞ + ∞ members may move from O→S; that is, if 
*( ( ) ( ( ) ) ) 1
( ) ( )
C C I I I







∞ + ∞ − >∞ + ∞  (and 
*( )I ID D∞ > ), then more of the population will 
support the government than the insurgency.  In other words, the government may gain 
supporters if the long run average number of actions by I that are active and are perceived 
to be damaging ( ( )ID ∞ ) is greater than the population tolerance; and the long run 
expected number of beneficial coalition actions that are active is greater than the long run 
expected number of damaging coalition actions that are active plus the long run expected 
number of beneficial insurgent actions that are active.  If *( )I ID D∞ <  and Iϕ−  is low 
(or, Cϕ+  is high), the population will tolerate the insurgency (and possibly move from 
S→O) until the number of damaging actions by I becomes larger than the ID∗  threshold.  
Actions that influence the population to support the government are actions by C that are 
perceived to be beneficial and actions by I that are perceived to be damaging and are in 
excess of the tolerance of the population for damaging actions by I; actions that influence 
the population to support the insurgency are actions by C that are perceived to be 
damaging and beneficial actions by I. More of the population will support the 
government than support the insurgency if the effect of actions that influence to 
population to support the government is greater than the effect of actions that influence 
the population to support the insurgency. 
 Equations (22) through (28) suggest many possible operational strategies.  Among 
those possible, the coalition could choose to focus efforts to increase Cγ , the removal rate 
of I by coalition forces, thereby decreasing the strength of insurgent forces in the limit (as 
a percentage of the total population). Reducing the strength of the insurgency would 
reduce ( )IB ∞  and, in turn, should increase ( )S ∞ ; however, it would also reduce 
( )ID ∞ . 
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2. Numerical Exploration of the Transient Solution and Analysis 
In this model, we numerically study the transient behavior of the model of 
equations (15)-(21).  For each analysis case, the initial population is 50% government 
supporters, 50% opposition supporters.  The coalition forces, ( )C t , remain constant at 
5% of the total population.  In our second model, all insurgency related 
parameters, Iβ + , Iβ − , Iμ+ , Iμ− , ρI  are non-zero except Iδ .  For simplicity, each case 
assumes the rate of insurgency recruitment per member of the insurgency equals the rate 
of removal of the insurgents per member of the insurgency by the coalition; that is,   
 ρI  = * * (0)C C Iγ .  In each case, Cϕ+  (respectively Cϕ− ) takes on the same value as Cα+  
(respectively Cα− ).  The values for the non-zero parameters for Figures 9 through 13 are 
displayed in Table 2.  
 
Input Value Fig 6 Fig 7 Fig 8 Fig 9 Fig 10 
S(0) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
O(0) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
C 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Cγ  1 1 1 1 1 
Cα+ , Cϕ+  0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.9 
Cα− , Cϕ−  0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 
Cν +  0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 














0.01 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.01 
Iβ + , Iϕ+  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.9 
Iβ − , Iϕ−  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.1 
Iμ+  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.1 














8.1 8.1 8.1 0.01 0.01 
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ −
∞ + ∞ + − ∞ 730 570 60 0.02 0.25 
ρI  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
ID
∗  0 0.5 0 0 0 
Government Support  
at 52 weeks* 
100% 100% 98% 2% 23% 
Government Opposition at 52 weeks* 0% 0% 2% 98% 77% 
Table 2.   Parameter Values for Model II 
Figures 6 and 7 below both depict the situation when the arrival rate of beneficial 
coalition actions per coalition member is 0.9 and the arrival rate of damaging coalition 
actions per coalition member is 0.1.  Figure 6 depicts the results when the population 
tolerance for insurgent violence is 0; whereas Figure 7 depicts the results when the 
population has a 0.5 tolerance for insurgent violence.  Although both figures display the 
fraction of the population that support the government equal to 1 at 52 weeks, the 
population tolerance of insurgent damaging actions has a significant impact on the 
fraction of government supporters during the initial 20 weeks of the scenario.  With a 0.5 
population tolerance, Figure 7 shows a significant initial drop in government support 
(almost 30%) in the first month.  The percentage of the population that supports the 
government does not equal the percentage of the population that opposes the government 
again until almost 12 weeks. 
 
                                                 
* Remainder is percentage of population active in the insurgency at 52 weeks. 
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Numerical solution by RK4 over time







Figure 6.   Many Beneficial Coalition Actions; Many Damaging Insurgent 
Actions; No Population Tolerance for Insurgent Violence=0  
(best viewed in color) 
 
 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time







Figure 7.   Many Beneficial Coalition Actions; Many Damaging Insurgent 
Actions; Population Tolerance for Insurgent Violence=0.5 
(best viewed in color) 
Figure 8 depicts the situation where the limiting effects of coalition actions 
perceived to be beneficial and damaging on the population support for the government 
are equal; that is 0.5C CC C
C C
α αϕ ϕν ν
+ −
+ −
+ −= = .  We see that when the insurgency is engaged in 
many more damaging actions than beneficial, the coalition is still able to influence the 
Initial 30% loss of government supporters 
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population's support for the government. In Figure 6 (respectively Figure 8) 
8.2 0.01C CC C
C C
α αϕ ϕν ν
+ −
+ −
+ −= > = (respectively 0.5
+ −
+ −
+ −= =C CC C
C C
α αϕ ϕν ν ).  Comparing Figures 6 
and 8, we see the support for the government in Figure 6 is only slightly higher at 52 
weeks than in Figure 8; in Figure 6 the ratio 
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ −
∞ + ∞ + − ∞  
=730  is greater than its value of 60 in Figure 8 and support for the government increases 
faster in Figure 6.  Thus the effectiveness of coalition actions on increasing the support of 
the population for the government depends on the ratio of beneficial coalition actions to 












αϕ ν ) and the rate of increase of 
support for the government (a faster rate of increase is indicated by a larger value of 
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ −
∞ + ∞ + − ∞ ) 
 
 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time






Figure 8.   Coalition Actions Are Neither Predominantly Beneficial Nor 
Predominantly Damaging; Many Damaging Insurgent Actions  




Finally, Figures 9 and 10 display the outcome of a situation in which many of the 




+ −= =C CC C
C C
α αϕ ϕν ν  (respectively 8.2 0.01
+ −
+ −
+ −= > =C CC C
C C
α αϕ ϕν ν ), and 
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) ) 1
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ − <∞ + ∞ + − ∞  in both figures. We see an initial surge of 
government support in Figure 10 where 
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) ) .025
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ − =∞ + ∞ + − ∞ ; 
but at 52 weeks, supporters of the insurgency outnumber supporters of the government.  
These two figures illustrate a crucial point:  if insurgent actions perceived as damaging by 
the population are very low or non-existent, there is very little the coalition can do to 
influence the population support or opposition of the government unless the reasons that 
lead to the insurgency are mitigated.   
If we use our intuition based on our model with no insurgency involvement to 
compare Figures 6 and 10, we would expect to see the long run average number of 











− =810 in both cases.  But, we see it is not enough simply to just "do more good 
things."  Even with a high rate of beneficial coalition actions per member as in Figure 10, 
the support for the government in this scenario is only 23% at 52 weeks.  We conclude 
that if the rate of damaging insurgent actions is low and the rate of beneficial insurgent 
actions is high, the government may continue to lose supporters regardless of coalition 
actions, and the coalition could be viewed as an occupying force rather than a positive 
influence. The effectiveness of coalition actions on the population's support of the 
government depends on the actions of the insurgency. If the population tends to view 
insurgency actions as predominantly beneficial, then even a coalition accomplishing 
actions seen as predominantly beneficial can do very little to influence the popular 
support for the government.  In this case reasons for the insurgency need to be mitigated.  
If the population tends to view insurgency actions as predominantly damaging, then even 
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a coalition accomplishing actions that are neither predominantly beneficial nor 
predominantly damaging has a significant positive influence on the popular support for 
the government. 
 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time






Figure 9.   Coalition Actions Are Neither Predominantly Beneficial Nor 
Predominantly Damaging; Many Beneficial Insurgent Actions 
(best viewed in color) 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time






Figure 10.   Many Beneficial Coalition and Insurgent Actions  
(best viewed in color) 
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E. FULL MODEL WITH PARAMETER VALUES INFORMED BY 
CONFLICT DATA 
The full model, equations (1) through (7) with all parameters non-zero, gives a 
more complete relationship of how all factors interact to influence the scenario outcome.  
As previously stated, the full model cannot be solved analytically, but we can exercise the 
model numerically. 
1. Parameter Value Selection for Pre- and Post-Surge 
As with most numerical models, correct input parameter value selection is crucial 
to obtaining reasonable and useful results.  When exercising our full model, we inform as 
many parameters as possible with available data.  For parameters not closely related to 
available data, we use nominal values.  Table 3 lists the parameter values, and the 
following paragraphs describe the method by which each parameter value was chosen.  
Our choices of parameter values serve as a suggestion for the model user.  If the user has 
access to more accurate or applicable data the user may be able to better estimate values 
of parameters for the specific scenario he/she wishes to investigate. 
Using the data as displayed in Table 3, we exercise the full model to investigate 
two scenarios—"pre-surge" and "post-surge."  Pre-surge data are taken from sources 
dated June 2007 and earlier; post-surge data are taken from sources dated July 2007 to 
present.  Both scenarios use data for Ar-Ramadi (aka: Ramadi, Ramadiyah) metro area of 
Al-Anbar province, Iraq.  Based on 2002 United Nations census statistics, Global 
Security ranks Ramadi the 11th largest city (in population) in Iraq (Global Security).  In 
her 2006 Washington Post article, Ann Tyson calls Ramadi "the deadliest city (in Iraq) 
for U.S. troops relative to its population" (Tyson 1). 
While we recognize there exist vast differences in the regions of Iraq due to many 
factors such as the cultural disparity between urban and rural dwellers and the tribal 
nature of some regions versus others, many sources only publish statistics for "all of Iraq" 
or "all Iraqi Sunnis".  We feel comfortable applying statistics given for "all Iraqi Sunnis" 
or "Mid-Euphrates" to the population of Ramadi; but it is with some hesitation we 
assume statistics given for "all of Iraq" apply to the population of Ramadi.   
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The March 2008 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) factbook lists the Iraq total 
population as 27.5M (28,000,000) (CIA). Based on 2003 UN data, the Iraqi Coalition 
Provisional Authority (ICPA) lists Ramadi’s population as 445K or, approximately 1.6% 
of the country’s total population (ICPA).  We scale each "all of Iraq" parameter to obtain 
a "percentage of Ramadi population" by multiplying by 0.02 (rounding the Ramadi 
population from 0.016 to 0.02).All parameters and scaling factors are rounded to two 
significant digits at each step of the scaling.  Additionally, all "event data" are scaled to 
maintain 1 timestep=1 week consistency.  For example, if 2000 prisoners were detained 
in one month in all of Iraq, then 2000*.02 10
4
=  prisoners per week were detained in 
Ramadi in one week.  A discussion of each parameter value selection method follows.   
Although estimates of insurgent force strength can be suspect, we use the data for 
Fallujah from the Wikipedia article "Iraq Insurgency" to inform I(0) as a percentage of 
the total population in Ramadi. Because of the proximity and similar demographics of the 
two cities, we are comfortable the ratio of insurgents to the general population in Fallujah 
is similar to the ratio of insurgents to the general population in Ramadi.  The Wikipedia 
article lists the upper estimate of insurgents in Fallujah in mid-2004 as 5,000.  Taken as a 
population ratio compared to the population of Fallujah 443,000≈ , our choice for I(0) is 
5,000 0.01
443,000
≈ . In the absence of data to inform a change in insurgent strength, we use 
( )0 0.01 I =  for both pre- and post-surge.   
Polling data from ABC News is used to inform S(0) and O(0).  In a March 2007 
poll, 8% of Sunnis expressed confidence in the National Government of Iraq (NGI).  In a 
February 2008 poll, 10% of Sunnis expressed confidence in the NGI (ABC News 27).  
We subtract I(0) values discussed above from O(0) to maintain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1t S t O t I tΦ = + + = .  Based on the adjusted numbers, our parameters for S(0) 
(respectively O(0)) for pre- and post-surge are 0.08 (respectively 0.91=1-0.08-0.01 
support the insurgency) and 0.10 (respectively 0.89=1-0.10-0.01 support the insurgency).  
Our choice of low values for support of the government is supported by a similar 
question referenced in the ABC News report in which Iraqi Sunnis were asked "Do you 
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approve or disapprove of the way Nouri Kame al-Maliki is handling his job as prime 
minister?"  In March 2007, 96% of Iraqi Sunnis expressed disapproval, and in February 
2008, 92% of Iraqi Sunnis expressed disapproval. 
To inform our C parameter value, we again use data from the Wikipedia articles 
"Iraq Insurgency" and "The Battle of Ramadi (2004)."  In "The Battle of Ramadi (2004)," 
Wikipedia lists the coalition troop strength at 1,500.  In "Iraq Insurgency," Wikipedia 
estimates 3,500 more Marines were sent to Ramadi in 2006 to "reestablish control of the 
region" (Wikipedia "Iraq Insurgency"). We use the estimated ratio of coalition troops in 
Ramadi to the population of Ramadi to inform C.  That is, 3,500 1,500 0.01
445,000
C += =  for 
both pre- and post-surge. 
To inform Cγ , the removal rate of I by coalition forces, we use data from a USA 
Today article by Jim Michaels.  Michaels’ data on insurgents killed spans March 2003 to 
September 2007.  The highest number of insurgents killed per month pre-surge is 1,623 
in August 2004 and post-surge is approximately 600 in July 2007 (Michaels 1).  The 
number of insurgents removed in Ramadi is calculated 1600*0.02 32R = =  in pre-surge 
and 600*0.02 12=  in post-surge.  An estimate of the number of coalition members in 
Ramadi is R * 450000*0.01 4500C population of Ramadi coalition percentage= = =  for 
pre- and post-surge.  An estimate of the number of insurgent members in Ramadi at time 
zero is R(0) * 450000*0.01 4500I population of Ramadi insurgent percentage= = =  for 
pre-surge and 450000*0.01 4500=  for post-surge.  For Ramadi, we calculate  
Cγ = 6
R R




−= = × ≈  for pre- and post-surge (to two 
significant digits). 
In the July 2007 Iraq Index, the estimates for the strength of the insurgency for 
each month between July 2004 and October 2006 are predominately 20,000 (26).  In the 
absence of data, we assume the March 2007 insurgency strength of 70,000 holds true for 
each subsequent month.  Based on O'Hanlon and Campbell's estimates, we assume the 
size of the insurgency changes very little month to month.  Initially, we calculate 
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S I C I
O
δ γρ += .  Having determined Cγ =0.00 for pre- and post-surge, 
we choose Iδ =0.05 (in the absence of data to inform Iδ ) and calculate pre-surge 
* (0)I Oρ ≈0.00046 and post-surge * (0)I Oρ ≈  0.00045.  Rounded to two significant 
digits, both pre- and post-surge Iρ = 0.00.  The size of the insurgent force in our model 
changes very slowly by virtue of our parameter selection, but it is not constant.   
We inform the parameter values used to model the population perception of 
beneficial and damaging coalition actions, Cα+ , Cϕ+ , Cα− , Cϕ− , Cν + , and Cν − , with data 
from the Iraq Index.  To inform Cα+ , the arrival rate of beneficial actions per coalition 
member, we use the number of weapons caches found and cleared in Al Anbar (O'Hanlon 
and Campbell "May 2008" 13).  Although the number of weapons caches cleared is not a 
direct measure of coalition actions perceived as beneficial by the population, we choose 
this data as an indication of the population perception of beneficial coalition actions 
relative to damaging coalition actions.  There are other data available that could be used 
to inform Cα+ , such as the number of coalition patrols with the Iraqi army/police. 
O'Hanlon and Campbell list caches cleared in Al Anbar for all of 2006 as 941 and for all 
of 2007 as 3,155.  We attribute 3,155 1600
2
≈  to January-June 2007 and the same amount 
to July-December 2007. So, for the period January 2006-June 2007 (pre-surge), there was 




+= ≈  caches cleared per week in Al 
Anbar.  From July-December 2007, there was an average of 1600 67
24
≈  caches cleared 
per week in Al Anbar. 35 3500
0.01
    
C
number of caches cleared by C
coalition as percentage of population
α+ = = =  for 
pre-surge and 67 6700
0.01C
α+ = ≈  for post-surge.   
Although the number of civilian deaths attributable to US forces is not a direct 
measure of coalition actions perceived as damaging by the population, we choose this 
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data as an indication of the population perception of damaging coalition actions relative 
to beneficial coalition actions.  In the absence of other data available that could be used to 
inform Cα− , we estimate Cα−  using data from the Iraq Body Count (IBC) website.  IBC 
lists a high estimate of 434 Iraqi civilian deaths attributable to US forces alone in all of 
Iraq in 2006 and a high estimate of 756 for 2007.  The IBC also lists a high estimate of 
623 Iraqi civilian bystanders killed in firefights and other attacks involving US-led 
coalition military forces in all of Iraq in 2006 and a high estimate of 1,326 for 2007.  We 
attribute 760 1300 1000
2
+ ≈  to January-June 2007 and the same amount to July-
December 2007.  So, for the period January 2006-June 2007 (pre-surge), there was an 
average of * (430 1000)*0.02 0.40
18*4
number of deaths Ramadi population scale
number of weeks
+= ≈  
civilian deaths due to coalition involvement per week in Ramadi.  From July-December 
2007 (post-surge), there was an average of 1000*0.02 0.83
24
≈  civilian deaths due to 
coalition involvement per week in Ramadi.  We calculate 
0.40 40
0.01C
arrival rate of damaging actions by C
coalition as percentage of population
α− = = ≈  for pre-surge and 
0.83 83
0.01C
α− = ≈  for post-surge.  We choose Cϕ+ = Cϕ− =0.2 as the parameter of the effect of 
coalition actions on popular support for/opposition to the government.   
For pre-surge, we choose Cν − =0.08 to reflect a population whose support for the 
government is influenced by damaging coalition actions for a mean time of 3 months.  
This is a notional parameter value, but our choice is based in an ABC News poll taken in 
August 2007.  Although this poll is taken outside our pre-surge time period, questions 
reference events occurring within our timeframe.  Of the 63% of the Iraqi Sunni 
population that answered "yes" to "tell me if unnecessary violence against citizens by US 
or coalition forces has occurred nearby here in the past 1-2 months, within 6 months, 
within the past year, or longer," almost half answered in the "1-2 months" or the "within 
6 months" categories.  We use the average of 3 months for insights into the population 
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mean time coalition damaging actions continue to influence opinion (ABC News 36).  In 
the absence of data, we choose Cν + = Cν − =0.08. 
For post-surge, we choose Cν − =0.04 to reflect a population for which damaging 
coalition actions continue to influence opinion for a mean time of 6 months (12 weeks).  
This is again a notional parameter value based in an ABC News poll taken in February 
2008.  Of the 57% of the Iraqi Sunni population that answered "yes" to "tell me if 
unnecessary violence against citizens by US or coalition forces has occurred nearby here 
in the past 1-2 months, within 6 months, within the past year, or longer," almost half 
answered "within the past six months" (ABC News 36).  In the absence of data, we 
choose Cν + = Cν − =0.04. 
As with the coalition parameters, we inform the parameter values used to model 
the population perception of beneficial and damaging insurgent actions, Iβ + , Iϕ+ , Iβ − , 
Iϕ− , Iμ+ , and Iμ− , with data from the Iraq Index.  To inform Iβ − , the arrival rate of 
damaging actions per insurgent, we use the number of multiple fatality bombings 
targeting civilians (Sunni) (O'Hanlon and Campbell "May 2008" 12).  From January 
2007-June 2007 (pre-surge), there was an average 5.5 multiple fatality bombings 
targeting Sunnis per month or 1.4 per week.  From July 2007-May 2008, there was an 
average 3.5 multiple fatality bombings targeting Sunnis per month or 0.88 per week. We 
calculate 1.4 140
0 0.01I
arrival rate of damaging actions by I
percentage of population active in the insurgency at time
β − = = =  
for pre-surge and 0.88 88
0.01I
β − = =  for post-surge.   
In the absence of data we assume the arrival rate of beneficial actions by I is 
lower than the arrival rate of damaging actions by I in both the pre- and post-surge 
environment. We choose pre-surge 140 47
3I
β + = =  and post-surge 88 29
3I
β + = ≈ .   
For pre-surge and post-surge, we choose Iμ− =0.08 to reflect a population for 
which damaging insurgent actions affect public opinion for a mean time of 3 months (12 
weeks).  These are notional parameter values, but our choice is based in ABC News polls 
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taken in August 2007 and February 2008.  Although the August 2007 poll is taken 
outside our pre-surge time period, it references actions occurring within our timeframe.  
Of the roughly 50% of the Iraqi Sunni population that answered "yes" to "tell me if car 
bombs, suicide attacks or kidnappings for ransom have occurred nearby here in the past 
1-2 months, within 6 months, within the past year, or longer," almost half answered in the 
"1-2 months" or the "within 6 months" categories (ABC News 34-35).  We use the 
average of 3 months to gain insight into the population mean time to damaging insurgent 
actions continue to influence opinion.  In the absence of data, we choose Iμ+ = Iμ− =0.08. 
We choose Iϕ+ = Iϕ−=0.1 to represent the effects of insurgent actions on popular 
support for/opposition to the government.  Our choice is strictly notional, but our choice 
for Iϕ−  is consistent with our calculated *ID , indicating a large population tolerance for 
insurgent violence.  We assume the large population tolerance indicates the population is 
not very responsive to damaging insurgent actions, thus our relatively low choice for Iϕ+  
and Iϕ− . 
Our choice for *ID , the population tolerance for insurgent violence, is informed by 
enemy initiated attacks against the coalition and its partners data from the May 2008 Iraq 
Index (O'Hanlon and Campbell 8).  We assume that the number of attacks is an indication 
of the population tolerance for damaging actions by the insurgency. Attacks against the 
coalition might, in some cases, be viewed as beneficial by the population, but because of 
the likelihood of collateral damage, we have chosen to use this data to inform *ID .  The 
average number of attacks per month in the pre-surge period in all of Iraq in September 
2006-June 2007 is about 1200.  The average number of attacks per month in the post-
surge period in all of Iraq in July-October 2007 is about 900.  We calculate 
* # *0.02
4I
average attacks per monthD = .  Pre-surge * 1200 *0.02 6
4I
D = =  and post-surge 
* 900 *0.02 4.5
4I
D = = . 
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In our final example, we specify *ID  informed by the effect of the Sahawah Al 
Anbar, or "Anbar Awakening," in which a 49-member council of provincial Sheikhs 
form a coalition to bring order to the Anbar region ("The Long War Journal").  We also 
choose notional values for Cϕ+ , Cϕ− , Iμ−  based on scenario changes we assume are 
plausible in the post-Awakening environment. 
We choose Iμ− =0.04 to reflect a population for which damaging insurgent actions 
continue to influence opinion for a mean time of 6 months (24 weeks) versus 3 months in 
the post-surge analysis.  Although our choice is notional, we assume the population is 
more likely to have damaging insurgent actions affect opinions in the Awakening 
environment; an environment where local leaders are discouraging insurgent violence. 
We choose Cϕ+ = Cϕ− =0.3 for the parameters representing the effects of coalition 
actions on popular support for/opposition to the government during the Awakening 
period.  Our choice is strictly notional, but we assume the population is more responsive 
to coalition actions given the coalition is working more closely with local leaders and is 
possibly more visible to the average citizen in this timeframe.  
We choose Iϕ+ = Iϕ−=0.2 for the parameters representing of effects of insurgent 
actions on popular support for/opposition to the government.  Our choice is strictly 
notional, but our choice for Iϕ−  is consistent with our calculated decrease in *ID  during 
the Awakening period, indicating a declining population tolerance for insurgent violence.  
We assume a declining population tolerance also indicates the population is becoming 
more responsive to damaging insurgent actions as the local leaders discourage insurgent 
violence in the post-Awakening environment. 
As in the pre- and post-surge environments, our choice for *ID , the population 
tolerance for insurgent violence in the post-Awakening environment, is informed by 
enemy initiated attacks against the coalition and its partners data from the May 2008 Iraq 
Index (O'Hanlon and Campbell 8).  We assume that the number of attacks that occur is an 
indication of the population tolerance.  The average number of attacks per month in the 
pre-surge period in all of Iraq in January-June 2007 is about 1200.  The average number 
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of attacks per month in the post-Awakening period in all of Iraq from November 2007 to 
February 2008 is about 300.  We calculate 
* # 300*0.02 *0.02 1.5
4 4I
average attacks per monthD = = = . 
 















( )0S  Informed 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 
( )0O  Informed 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.89 
( )0I  Informed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
C  Informed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Cγ  Informed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cα+  Informed 3500 3500 6700 6700 6700 
Cϕ+  Notional 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.30 
Cα−  Informed 40 40 83 83 83 
Cϕ−  Notional 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.30 
Cν +  Notional 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 















Calculated 100 100 420 420 620 
Iβ +   Informed 47 47 29 29 29 
Iϕ+  Notional 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 
Iβ −  Notional 140 140 88 88 88 
Iϕ−  Notional 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 
Iμ+  Notional 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 















Calculated 180 180 110 110 440 
*
ID  Informed 6.0 0* 4.5 0
* 1.5 
 ρI  Calculated 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Iδ  Notional 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
S(52)  11% 92% 22% 95% 53% 
O(52)  88% 7% 77% 4% 46% 
I(52)  1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Table 3.   Full Model Values Informed By Conflict Data 
If we assume constant coalition size C and constant insurgent force size I, we 
investigate the long run average of number of beneficial (damaging) coalition (insurgent) 
actions still influencing the population and the fraction of active coalition (insurgent) 
actions perceived as beneficial (damaging) using the equations below: 
 *( ) CC
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+∞ = .   (31) 
 *( ) II






  (32) 
                                                 
* Notional value for analysis. 
  47
 ( )










































∗∞ =∞ + ∞ ∗ + ∗	

.   (34) 
 
 ( )


















∗∞ =∞ + ∞ ∗ + ∗	

  (35) 
 ( )


















∗∞ =∞ + ∞ ∗ + ∗	






** *( ( ) )
( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
* *( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ) * * *( ( ) )
C
C I I I
C C I I I C
C IC C I I I I I
C I I I I
C IMeasureof increase of government support
C D D
B D D
C ID B D D D D
αϕ ϕϕ ϕ ν
α βϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕν μ
+
+ − +
+ − + +
− +− + − +
− + − +
− +
+ ∞ −∞ + ∞ − =∞ + ∞ + − ∞ + + ∞ −	

  (37) 
 
Table 4 gives the results of equations (29) through (37) to two significant digits based on 
our pre-surge, post-surge, and post-Awakening parameter values displayed in Table 3.  
We assume C=0.05 in pre-surge and 0.07 in post-surge and post-Awakening analysis.  




Approximate Long Run Number of Actions Active 







( )CB ∞  440 1700 1700 
( )CD ∞  5.0 21 21 
( )IB ∞  5.9 3.6 3.6 
( )ID ∞  18 11 22 
Approximate Fraction of Active Actions    
( )






∞ + ∞  
0.99 0.99 0.99 
( )






∞ + ∞  
0.01 0.01 0.01 
( )






∞ + ∞  
0.25 0.25 0.14 
( )






∞ + ∞  
0.75 0.75 0.86 
Approximate Ratio of Effects of Increase to Government 
Support 
   
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ −
∞ + ∞ + − ∞  
56 74 73 
Table 4.   Approximate Long Run Average Number of Active Actions 
and Fraction of Active Actions Influencing the Population 
2. Numerical Exploration of the Transient Solution and Analysis 
Figure 11 displays results for pre-surge operations using the parameter values 
listed in Table 3.  In the pre-surge scenario, the percentage of the population that opposes 
the government after 52 weeks is 88% and the population that supports the government is 
11%.  Consistent with our parameter selection method for ρI , Iδ , and Cγ , the 
insurgency reduces slowly.  At 52 weeks it is roughly its initial strength of 1% (to 2 
significant digits).  In the pre-surge scenario, we see the predominantly "beneficial" 
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coalition is slow to influence popular support toward the government given a population 
with a very high tolerance for violence ( *ID =6). 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time







Figure 11.   Pre-Surge Scenario with Informed Parameters 
(best viewed in color) 
Figure 12 displays results for pre-surge operations with a value of 0 for *ID , 
population tolerance for insurgent violence.  Comparing Figures 11 and 12 suggests the 
relative importance of lowering the population tolerance for insurgent violence.  By 
focusing efforts to ensure the population has zero tolerance for insurgent violence, our 
analysis indicates support for the government is 81% higher at 52 weeks with a change in 
population tolerance from 6 to 0 attacks per week in Ramadi.  Even an initial minority of 
government supporters is able to equal the percentage of the population that opposes the 
government at about 18 weeks when *ID  = 0 in the pre-surge environment. We conclude 
the increase in government support in a scenario with zero population tolerance for 
insurgent violence is a result of a sizeable decrease in population's tolerance for insurgent 
violence without any decrease in insurgent violence. 
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Numerical solution by RK4 over time








Figure 12.   Pre-Surge; Population Tolerance for Insurgent Violence = 0 
(best viewed in color) 
Figure 13 displays the results for post-surge operations using the parameter values 
displayed in Table 3.  In the post-surge scenario, the percentage of the population that 
opposes the government after 52 weeks is 77%, and the percentage of the population that 
supports the government is 22%.  Consistent with our parameter selection method for ρI , 
Iδ , and Cγ , the insurgency reduces slowly but is still 1% at 52 weeks (to 2 significant 
digits).  In the post-surge scenario, we see the coalition force with a predominant number 
of actions perceived by the population as beneficial begins to positively influence support 
for the government when *ID  = 4.5.  From the values in Table 3, we calculate the post-
surge approximate (assumes I is constant) long run fraction of active insurgent actions 
perceived as damaging by the population as ( )






∞ + ∞ = 0.74 to two significant 
digits.  This long run fraction is only a slight (0.01) decrease from the pre-surge fraction; 
whereas the population's tolerance for violence decreased 25% (4.5/6) from the tolerance 
in the pre-surge scenario.  From Table 3, we calculate the post-surge approximate ratio of 




( ( ) ( ( ) ) ) 74 56
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ − = >∞ + ∞ + − ∞  (pre-surge).  We conclude the 
increase in government support in the post-surge scenario is a result of a sizeable 
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decrease in population's tolerance for insurgent violence without a sizeable decrease in 
insurgent violence.  The fact that the percentage of the population that supports the 
government increases faster (as measured by a ratio of parameters specified in our 
approximate limiting solution discussion: 
*
*
( ( ) ( ( ) ) )
( ( ) ( ) ( ( )) )
C C I I I
C C I I I I I
B D D




− + − +
∞ + ∞ −
∞ + ∞ + − ∞ ) in 
the post-surge scenario also contributes to the increase in government support from 11% 
in the pre-surge scenario to 22% in the post-surge scenario at 52 weeks. 
 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time







Figure 13.   Post-Surge Scenario with Informed Parameters 
(best viewed in color) 
 Figure 14 displays results for post-surge operations with a value of 0 for *ID , 
population tolerance for insurgent violence.  Comparing Figures 13 and 14 shows the 
relative importance of lowering the population tolerance for violence.  Although the data 
indicate a one-quarter (4.5/6)  drop in population tolerance from pre-surge to post-surge 
environment, we still see that focusing efforts to ensure the population has zero tolerance 
for insurgent violence may increase support for the government. Mitigating the reasons 
for the existence of the insurgency may decrease the population’s tolerance of damaging 
actions.  In our analysis of a population with zero tolerance for insurgent violence in the 
post-surge environment, support for the government is 73% higher (95% versus 22%) at 
52 weeks with a change in tolerance from 4.5 attacks in Ramadi per week to 0.  The time 
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at which the initial minority of government supporters grows to equal the percentage of 
population that opposes the government is about 15 weeks, which is smaller than in the 
pre-surge scenario, displayed in Figure 12. 
 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time








Figure 14.   Post-Surge; Population Tolerance for Insurgent Violence = 0 
(best viewed in color) 
 Figure 15 displays results using the *ID  informed by post-Awakening data and 
notional values for Cϕ+ , Cϕ− , Iμ−  based on scenario changes we assume are plausible in 
the post-Awakening environment..  We see the predominantly beneficial coalition 
influences popular support of the government enough to overcome the majority 
opposition at time 0 at about 40 weeks, and government support is at 53% at 52 weeks.  
The analysis indicates this is due to a lower population tolerance for violence ( *ID  = 1.5), 
an increased responsiveness to coalition beneficial and damaging actions 
( Cϕ+ = Cϕ− =0.30), an increased responsiveness to insurgent beneficial and damaging 
actions ( + −=I Iϕ ϕ =0.20), and an increase in the mean time damaging insurgent actions 
effect the popular opinion ( Iμ− =0.04) as compared to the post-surge scenario.  If we make 
only the change to *ID  from 4.5 in post-surge to 1.5 in this analysis (with other parameter 
values equal to those in post-surge analysis), we see similar results with 57% of the 
population supporting the government, 42% opposing the government, and 1% active in 
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the insurgency at 52 weeks.  The time at which the initial minority of government 
supporters grows to equal the percentage of population that opposes the government is 
approximately 32 weeks (displayed in Figure 16). 
 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time







Figure 15.   "Anbar Awakening" Informed Parameters 
(best viewed in color) 




























Numerical solution by RK4 over time







Figure 16.   "Anbar Awakening" Informed *ID  only 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESULTS 
 In this thesis we present and study a system of differential equations to represent 
the effect of coalition forces engaging in stability operations on the support of the local 
population for the government and insurgency.  In Chapter III, we develop the baseline 
model that is exercised in the analysis of various special case scenarios in Chapter VI.  
Many other models are possible such as those discussed in the working papers by Jacobs 
et al. and Gaver et al., the theses by Seitz and Ferris, and suggested in this study's further 
research.   
The primary goal is to provide decision makers insight into how best to employ 
the coalition forces and influence the factors under their control.  Another goal is to 
provide insight into what a model for stability operations should represent. Using the 
results from our analysis in Chapter VI and the steady-state relationships resulting 
directly from the equations, we can distinguish the important factors that have the biggest 
positive impact on the scenario outcome for the models considered here. 
First, we consider a case with no insurgent effect on the population where only 
the coalition actions influence the population’s support for the government.  The analysis 
focuses only on factors under a coalition decision maker’s direct control and finds that 
intuition holds—the coalition decision maker must focus efforts to ensure the expected 
effect of the number of actions perceived as beneficial by the population outweigh the 
expected effect of number of actions perceived to be damaging.  Overall, we find that the 
greatest positive effect comes when decision makers concentrate on both performing 
actions deemed beneficial by the population and mitigating the effects of coalition 
actions deemed damaging by the population. 
Next we consider a case where the population is influenced by insurgent actions 
but there is no recruitment from the population to the insurgency or desertion from the 
insurgency to the population. The size of the population (excepting those active in the 
insurgency) is constant and the actions of both the coalition and insurgency can affect the 
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support of the population for the government.  In this scenario where all factors are not 
controlled by the decision maker, we find that the population’s tolerance for actions by 
the insurgency perceived to be damaging (violence) influences the population’s support 
for the government during the first month of the scenario for the cases studied.  Although 
a higher population tolerance for violence does not influence the long run amount of 
support for the government for the cases studied, we see a significant loss of government 
support in the first 4 weeks. The coalition decision maker may focus efforts on ways to 
lower the population tolerance for violence.  Perhaps, if the population is given a better 
sense of security and well-being they will be less tolerant of insurgent actions that would 
disrupt that sense of security.  Perhaps if the population is made to feel more "in control" 
of their own land, they will be less willing to tolerate insurgent actions that usurp that 
control.  A higher population tolerance for insurgent actions perceived as damaging may 
possibly be indicative of a population that is more likely to support the insurgency.  The 
results of this model also illustrate a crucial point:  if insurgent actions perceived as 
damaging by the population are very low or non-existent, there is very little the coalition 
can do to influence the population support or opposition of the government unless the 
causes that gave rise to the insurgency are addressed by the coalition or other appropriate 
agency (e.g. the state department).  If the insurgency is participating in predominantly 
beneficial actions, the best the coalition can do is match the level of insurgent beneficial 
actions. 
Finally, we consider a model with full interaction of coalition and insurgent 
actions and their effect on the population’s support for the government.  In our analysis of 
the full model, we proposed possible data points that could be used inform the parameter 
values.  We hope the user would have access to more appropriate or more refined data to 
better inform parameter values for the specific scenario he/she wishes to investigate.  We 
use the full model to investigate two scenarios—"pre-surge" and "post-surge."  We then 
specify post-surge parameter values where data informs specific links to the effect of the 
Sahawah Al Anbar, or "Anbar Awakening," in which a 49-member council of provincial 
Sheikhs form a coalition to bring order to the Anbar region ("The Long War Journal").  
We assume the coalition established an environment conducive to the formation of the 
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Awakening Councils, and attribute the positive effects of the Awakening to post-surge 
coalition parameters.  With our chosen parameters, we conclude the increase in 
government support in the post-surge scenario is a result of a sizeable decrease in 
population's tolerance for insurgent violence without a sizeable decrease in insurgent 
violence.  The fact that the percentage of the population that supports the government 
increases faster (as measured by a ratio of parameters specified in our approximate 
limiting solution discussion) in the post-surge scenario than in the pre-surge also 
contributes to an overall increase from the pre-surge to the post-surge scenario in the 
percentage of the population that supports the government at 52 weeks.  When we 
examine the post-Awakening scenario, we find an even faster rate of increase in 
government support, and we conclude this faster rate of increase (as measured by a ratio 
of parameters specified in our approximate limiting solution discussion) is the reason our 
scenario in the post-Awakening environment is the only scenario informed by conflict 
data where the support for the government exceeds the opposition for the government at 
the end of the 52-week analysis period. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study contains many possible follow on opportunities for both applied 
mathematicians and operations analysts.  Additional relationships evident in the system 
of equations could be explored.  Although we chose to analyze only three possible 
models, many extensions to the basic model proposed in this study exist.  Natural 
extensions of our proposed model include, but are not limited to the following: 
1. The expansion and or refinement of the state variables may be realistic and 
useful, but is avoided in this study to maintain simplicity. A progressively more 
complex sequence of models with additional actors and action classifications 
could be introduced and studied. State variables to account for the actions non-
governmental organizations, the state department, and neutral members of the 
population may be of interest. 
 
2. We assumed the labeling of actions as beneficial or damaging is strictly 
dependent on the (sub) population that is subject to this action. Future study could 
be devoted to the case including a relaxation of this assumption and could include 
a measurement of world opinion or media bias as a determining factor for whether 
an action is labeled beneficial or damaging, for example. 
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3. We assumed that ideological desertion from I was not possible.  
Subsequent studies could include both ideological desertion and the "convenience 
desertion" scenario described in this study.  Inclusion of the possibility of 
ideological desertion would allow transition from I Æ S.   
 
4.  We assumed only one subpopulation.  Subsequent studies could 
investigate the effects of introducing more than one subpopulation. 
 
5. The full model does not have a closed form analytic solution unless the 
total population, ( )tΦ , is held constant.  Subsequent studies could examine the 
analytic solution of the full model with constant total population. 
 
6. Our model does not represent the reintroduction of "removed" insurgents 
back into the population. Enhanced models could represent detention and release 
of people where the released detainees re-enter O.  
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APPENDIX: ANALYTICAL RESULTS FOR MODEL I  
















= (ϕC−DC (t)∗ S(t)) − (ϕC+ BC (t)∗O(t))  (13) 
A. STEADY STATE DERIVATION 
Setting left-hand sides to zero yields: 
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B. ANALYTIC SOLUTION FOR FINITE TIME  
Assuming constant C, then 
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Confirming the limiting solution: 
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